Often, criminals are of two kinds: there are those who know that the wrong they do is wrong -- and there are those who think -- who actually believe -- that their deeds are virtuous. When those of the latter category have a religious basis for their activities, they can rarely be dissuaded by legal and penal measures alone, for bearing chastisement is in itself sublime to them -- something that gives them a cause to rejoice in being 'persecuted for righteousness' sake' -- something that only adds to their commitment. The best defense against these people is an attack on the religious foundation their leaders use to convince them. A fortiori, legal and penal measures must be accompanied by propagation of counter arguments. For this purpose, arguments developed on the basis of superficial study won't do. No one is easily convinced into becoming a murderer on religious grounds and no one is easily dissuaded once so convinced. Only arguments truly emanating from the Qur'an and the Sunnah and cogent enough can be effective. Unfortunately, very little work has been done in the regard by government as well as private institutions.
It is important to know what arguments the militants use to justify their deeds and to see whether these arguments have any basis in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. This dissertation discusses some pertinent issues in this regard, including incendiary questions as the following:
Does Islam give an individual or a group the right to use violence to end wrong? What arguments do the militant Islamists have to justify their acts of terrorism and violence? Is the government of Pakistan un-Islamic? When is an individual or a group allowed by Islam to rebel against the State? What are the punishments in Islam for those who rebel against the State or cause disruption in society? What exactly is the meaning of Jihad and who has the right to wage it? Is 'turning the other cheek' a Christian belief only? What are the rules for a preacher in Islam? What is the actual responsibility of religious leaders? Does an individual or a group have the right to declare a Muslim a Kafir? What are the rights of the non-Muslim citizens of an Islamic State? Who has the authority to punish a person or a group for blasphemy? What steps does the government need to take to end violence and terrorism now rampant in our society in the name of religion?
This dissertation, a major part of which is based on Javed Ahmad Ghamidi's research work (a meritorious religious scholar and founder of Al-Mawrid, an institute of Islamic research), has three sections: the first gives a summary of the main conclusions drawn in the article, the second recommends certain strategies to the government for dealing with sectarian violence and terrorism, and the last section contains the main article. An appendix at the end responds to some criticisms on the views expressed in the dissertation.
I. Summary of the main conclusions
1. Taking the law into one's own hands amounts to either Fasad fi'l-Ard (creating disorder) or Muharabah (rebellion) -- both of which are punishable by death in Islam.
2. The Prophet's saying (sws) usually cited to give credence to the idea that Islam allows an individual or a group the use of force to end wrong is actually related to the use of power within the confines of the social and legal authority.
3. In Islam, there is no concept of Jihad (Qital to be more precise -- that is militant struggle in the way of Allah) or the implementation of punishments without the authority of the State.
4. The argument that the government in Pakistan is not Islamic is baseless. In an independent State, any government formed on the basis of amruhum shura baynahum (their affairs are by consultation among them) -- in modern times through the vote of the Muslim citizens in an election -- is an Islamic government so long as the rulers do not unequivocally deny Islam or their faith in it.
5. Rebellion against the State (Khuruj) is allowed -- that is it is permissible not obligatory -- only when all of the following three conditions exist:
- i) the rulers unequivocally deny Islam.
ii) the government is a dictatorship and does not have the support of the Muslims and cannot be changed by their vote.
iii) the leader of Khuruj is one who, without any doubt, has the support of the majority of the nation.
Moreover, in case of an armed rebellion, there is an additional condition: the leader of the Khuruj must migrate with his followers to another land and form an independent State.
In the absence of even one of these conditions, those leading the Khuruj can be sentenced to death by the State under Islamic law.
6. Allegiance to the Islamic State and obedience to its government are obligatory on a Muslim even if the rulers are morally corrupt. According to a reported saying of the Prophet (sws), he who detaches himself from the collectivity of the Muslims and dies in that condition dies the death of ignorance.
7. No individual or group has the right to declare a Muslim Kafir (one who deliberately denies Islam; plural: Kuffar). Takfir -- declaring someone a Kafir is the prerogative of either the Prophet (sws) -- who does that through Divine revelation -- or that State which represents the collectivity of the Ummah (the whole Muslim community).
8. The argument of the militant Islamists that their aggression is in self-defense is baseless. The difference between self-defense and aggression is manifest. Also, the law of Qisas in Islam is to be implemented by the State not by any individual or group. The aggrieved person has the right to demand Qisas, and it is the responsibility of the State to provide him with justice. The aggrieved or his heir also has the authority to forgive the offender and demand penalty. But there is no room in Islam for personal vendettas, in which people take the law into their own hands.
9. Religious scholars and leaders of religious movements can best serve Islam by staying out of politics and confining themselves to academic work and Da'wah (propagation of religion). They must remember that their primary responsibility is Indhar (admonition) and Da'wah. Their goal should be conquering the hearts of people rather than killing them. For the conquest of hearts one has to be slain rather than slaying others. One has to forgive rather than avenge. And one has to repel evil with goodness.
Some other points of relevance to which this article alluded are:
1. Death punishment for apostasy was confined only to the people the Prophet (sws) was directly sent to -- the Banu Isma'il. No one can now be punished to death on that basis as no one after the Prophet (sws) can claim to have done Itmamu'l-Hujjah (manifesting the truth to such an extent that no excuse whatsoever is left for a person to deny it) in his individual capacity.
2. There are only two valid reasons for Qital: i) injustice and oppression and ii) Itmamu'l-Hujjah. After the Prophet (sws) no individual or group has the position to do Itmamu'l-Hujjah. Itmamu'l-Hujjah is now possible only when the whole Ummah fulfils its responsibility of becoming 'Ummah Wasat (the best community) by living out the true meaning of its creed and thereby fulfils the responsibility of Shahadah 'ala'l-Nas (bearing witness to the truth of Islam before other peoples of the world). After fulfilling this responsibility, the State representing the collectivity of the 'Ummah has the right to depose such rulers of the vanquished nations as deliberately deny their people access to the message of Islam. But that State does not have the right to coerce people into accepting Islam. These non-Muslims would only be required to remain subservient to the Islamic State and to pay it their equitable dues and in return would receive protection and have all their basic rights ensured.
3. Lynching non-Muslim citizens of an Islamic State for blasphemy is absolutely against Islam even if the criminal is caught red-handed. Punishing a person or a group for any crime against anybody is the prerogative of the Islamic State -- which does that through its organ, the judiciary, after determining for sure that the crime had actually been committed and deciding on the appropriate punishment.a No individual has the right to take the law into his own hands on any account. Even the closest of the Prophet's companions (sws) never killed a single of his opponents even when invectives were hurled at him day and night in the first thirteen years of his Da'wah at Makkah. Nor did they kill anyone in retaliation when he was pelted with stones at Ta'if.
In relation to the points discussed above, the following measures are suggested to the government of Pakistan:
i) The government should use its propaganda machinery -- including the mass media -- to dissuade youngsters from falling into the trap of those religious leaders who equate terrorism and sectarian violence with Islam. The government should take help from genuine scholars of Islam for this purpose and present its views on the solid basis of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. It should become obvious to every man and woman -- even to the militant Islamists themselves -- that the violence and terrorism of the militant Islamists is absolutely against Islam.
ii) Known and self-proclaimed offenders should immediately be arrested or shot on sight for Muharabah, and Fasad fi'l-Ard. The arrested criminals should be punished on these bases in an exemplary manner. The government should publicize the reasoning behind these punishments so that everyone is aware of the correct stance in this regard and potential offenders are deterred from the path of violence.
iii) Those religious organizations which believe in rebellion against the State should be given a stern warning. The correct picture of Islam regarding Khuruj should be publicized a great deal so that sufficient ground work is done to make the masses mentally accept the idea of the government crushing the very first insurrection to nip the evil in the bud. And that the government should do: completely crush the first insurrection to emerge so that no one is encouraged by the rebels to follow suit.
iv) The government should take steps to eliminate the duality in our education system. Religious schools breed sectarianism and modern schools breed skepticism. To deal with this problem, our education system needs to be changed. Unless the modern, educated people -- especially those belonging to the elite and affluent classes -- are instructed at least in the basics of religion, the monopoly and influence of sectarian schools is bound to remain.b
v) The mosque has a very important role to play in an Islamic society. Few people today realize the extent to which this institution influences the minds of the masses. Unfortunately, mosques in our society have become citadels of sectarianism. There is great need to overhaul this institution. The key point here is that the Mosque is a State institution and the elected representatives of the people running their State affairs ought to be their leaders in prayer rather than the mullahs. The Sunnah in this regard is that the Head of the State and his representatives in the administration should lead the Friday prayer. On the basis of the Sunnah, one can suggest that the government should supervise the mosques and not let any particular sect control them. A number of steps should be taken in this regard:c
a) The center of every administrative unit of the State should be a Jami' Masjid, and the division of these units should be such that one Jami' Masjid should suffice for one unit.
b) Within each unit, all the administrative offices and courts should be instituted adjacent to this Jami' Masjid.
c) The State capital, together with the provincial capitals, should have a central Jami' Masjid.
d) The address of the Friday prayer should be delivered only by the Head of State and only he should lead this prayer in the central Jami' Masjid of the capital. The provincial governors should be entrusted with this job in the central Jami' Mosques of the provinces, while the representatives of the government should perform this duty in the Jami' Mosques of the various administrative units.
e) The Friday prayer should be prohibited in all mosques except the above ones.
f) Mosques should be supervised by the government itself.
g) Any religious scholar should be allowed to teach, educate and instruct his students according to his own views in any of these mosques.
vi) The government should make it clear to all Muslims that there is no room for lynching in Islam. No one can be punished for blasphemy unless his crime is proved in a court of law and only the State has the right to execute the sentence. It should also be made clear that violation of the rights of non-Muslims in an Islamic State is a serious offence.
Whether a Mu'ahid or a Dhimmi d , the rights guaranteed to a non-Muslim must not be violated by any Muslim. The Qur'an says:
- And fulfill the covenant. Verily the covenant shall be questioned about. (17:34)
The Prophet (sws) is reported to have said:
- Beware! He who oppresses a Mu'ahid or does him injustice or burdens him more than his strengthe or takes anything from him without his consent, I myself shall plead against him on the Day of Judgment. (Abu Da'ud, Kitabu'l-Jihad)
These words of the Prophet (sws) should be enough for any Muslim to realize the gravity of the sin of oppressing a Mu'ahid. Even in case of enmity, the Qur'an does not allow the Muslim to do anything against the principles of equity and justice. f
Therefore, unless a Mu'ahid is found guilty of some crime by a court of law -- in which case it is up to the court to decide what punishment is to be meted out --, he has the right as a citizen of an Islamic State to demand the protection of his life, honor and property and to demand all his fundamental rights including the right to practice and preach his religion in a manner which does not cause disruption in society.
In your article 'Terrorism, Murder and Manslaughter -- All in the Name of Allah' (published March-April, 1997), you have tried to prove that there is no concept of Jihad -- militant struggle to be more precise -- in Islam without the authority of the State. In this regard, I have four questions:
- i) Abu Basir, a convert to Islam in the Prophet's time (sws), formed a base near Duh'l-Marwah and launched guerrilla warfare from there, ultimately forcing the Quraysh to make peace with him. Wouldn't you agree that his stance proves your point invalid?
- ii) Isn't your idea a negation of the Jihad in Kashmir?
- iii) Isn't your idea a negation of Hadrat Husayn's stand against Yazid?
iv) Your ideas seem very close to those of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani regarding Jihad. Do you believe in his other ideas as well?
Abu Basir was bound by the Pact of Hudaybiyyah to remain in Makkah, but he defected to the Muslims in Madinah. The Prophet (sws), in accordance with the terms of the pact, returned him to the Quraysh by handing him over to two representatives from their side. Abu Basir killed one of them on the way back; the other ran away and came to the Prophet (sws). Abu Basir also returned to the Prophet (sws) and told him that by handing him over to the Quraysh the Prophet (sws) had fulfilled his promise and that thenceforth Abu Basir was himself responsible for all his actions. Thereafter, Abu Basir left Madinah and went to 'is near Dhul'l Marwah. Soon a number of other defectors joined him and began ambushing the trade caravans of the Quraysh. Finally, the Quraysh relaxed the conditions of the pact for him, and he, along with his companions, settled down in Madinah.34
I find it hard to understand how Abu Basir's story can become a basis for equating the looting of caravans with Qital fi sabil Allah. How can one ignore the fact that Abu Basir, after killing one man, told the Prophet (sws) that he was then responsible for his own actions and that the Prophet (sws) had fulfilled his promise by handing him over to the Quraysh. The only thing that went in favor of Abu Basir was that he got lucky enough to get a relaxation from the Quraysh, who had become tired of his ambushes.
The chance that God afforded to Abu Basir in the form of pardon by the Quraysh might be indicative of His mercy for a convert to Islam, but it does not in any way negate a principle emanating from the Qur'an and the Sunnah for Qital.
ii) 'No Qital without the authority of the State' is not 'my idea'. It is a deduction from the Qur'an for which deduction detailed arguments were given in the article. Calling this deduction 'your idea' does not prove it wrong. You can call it anything that pleases you: your idea, your imagination, your trickery, but only sound counter arguments from the Qur'an and the Sunnah can negate what is presented on these bases.
Regarding the struggle in Kashmir, I should like to ask you if you regard all what Muslims do as truly Islamic. Isn't it possible -- as has been the case many a time in our history -- that a Muslim or a group of Muslims -- despite our emotional attachment to that person or group -- may be doing something against the Qur'an without realizing it? What are the criteria? That is the question. Are the criteria the Qur'an and the Sunnah or actions and emotions of the Muslims? If actions and emotions are the criteria, 'Umar (raa) should not have submitted to Abu Bakr's argument (raa) when he recited the Qur'an on the death of our Prophet (sws).
In Kashmir, different factions fighting Indian hegemony have different objectives and strategies. Which objectives and strategies are right and which are wrong? Is Kashmir another Afghanistan in the making (where Muslims fought and killed Muslims)? These questions should be of interest to every patriotic Pakistani Muslim. However, the question here is not Kashmir. It is the Qur'an and the Sunnah. What are the arguments from within the Qur'an and on the basis of the Sunnah which negate the principle of No Qital without the Authority of the State?
I do not deny the plight of the Kashmiri Muslims or the atrocities of the Indians. Indeed, if it were my choice alone, I should like to bomb all the Indians out of Kashmir -- may be even out of India. But again the question is: How do the Qur'an and the Sunnah want me to go about it?
If you look at the article from this angle, you'll find that it does not negate Jihad in Kashmir. It merely spells out the right way to do it.
My article does not stop Pakistan or any other Muslim State -- from Morocco to Indonesia -- to wage an armed Jihad against India. Indeed, that, according to the article, would absolutely be in accordance with the dictates of Islam provided that the Jihad is morally and tactically justified. If, in that Jihad, my country or 'the United Muslim States' asked for my services as an individual, I should regard it as a matter of my faith to render them. In the existing circumstances, however, we must ask ourselves whether or not we are deceiving our conscience with insignificant measures as slogans, seminars and rallies to cover up for the lack of courage and tactical ability at the level of our State -- and even at the level of the Ummah -- to wage an all out Jihad for our Kashmiri brethren.
iii) Regarding Hadrat Husayn's stand against Yazid, again the first question is related to the criteria?
It is evident from the Qur'an that the Qur'an and the Sunnah are the actual sources of Divine guidance, not history. Not only has the veracity of various historical records been a subject of continual debate, the contexts in which events have been reported are also not always clear. Why then should one rely on a human source of knowledge for deriving religious principles when two indubitable sources of Divine guidance -- the Qur'an and the Sunnah -- are available?
As Muslims, we can assume that Hadrat Husayn did what he thought was correct. But what exactly was it that he did? What actually happened? Much has been written on these issues and much needs to be written. Research on this aspect of our history, it seems, will continue. We, however, have to decide about religion on the basis of the Qur'an and the Sunnah.
As far as history is concerned, who knows further research might confirm for sure that Hadrat Husayn decided to go to Kufa just to form an independent State there for fulfilling a condition of Khuruj and that on finding out that the people of Kufa had backed out from supporting him, he offered to pledge allegiance to Yazid35 (one of the three propositions he made) not as a compromise but as his compliance with the Qur'anic principle of government by the majority-vote of the Muslims (The Qur'an 42:38).
In any case, the fact remains that he did not retaliate militarily against State while going towards Kufa, and, therefore, his stance cannot be equated with that of those who kill innocent people in the name of religion and who, without having formed an independent State, retaliate militarily against established authority.
iv) The views expressed in my article may seem close to those of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani regarding Qital fi sabil Allah but actually they are quite different and based on other premises. You must remember that the views in my article do not negate Qital fi sabil Allah. They only spell out the truly Islamic way of doing it.
I am a Muslim and believe very firmly in the finality of Muhammad's Prophethood (sws) in all senses of the word. I believe that the Prophet (sws) is now the only and final source of Divine guidance for mankind and that he has passed on the religion of Islam to us through two undeniable sources: the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Apart from these two sources, there is no other undeniable source of the contents of religion.
The views expressed in my article are based on these two bases. I do not care whose ideas they are similar with. My only concern is whether they are a correct interpretation of these two bases or not, and, as a student of religion and as a Muslim, I should be glad to change my views if any argument based on the Qur'an and Sunnah proved them incorrect.
a. Punishment for blasphemy against Islam or any of the Prophets (sws) is a matter for the State to decide. Such punishment, if given, would not be against freedom of expression. Freedom of expression does not mean that a person has the right to stand outside my house and hurl abuses. 'The freedom to extend your arm ends where the tip of my nose begins' -- a useful adage to remind us that freedom is a privilege and as any privilege entails responsibility. That responsibility also includes giving due regard to the sentiments and feelings of others. In an Islamic State, the greatest regard the people have is for Allah and the Prophet (sws) and any person -- Muslim or Non-Muslim -- must keep in mind the fact that desecration of Islam is the most provocative act against the collectivity of the Muslims. However, Islam does not entail any punishment for blasphemy. Indeed, on many occasions sagacity demands that acts of blasphemy be dealt with by completely ignoring them. The way the Prophet (sws) and his companions dealt with blasphemy in their time is a good proof of the wisdom in the strategy of ignoring something worthless, which can become a hot issue when given undue attention. (For further details, see Waheed-ud-Din Khan, Shatm-i-Rasul, Lahore: Khak-i-Watan Printers, 1997).
b. For a brief overview of the overall changes required in our education system, see Shehzad Saleem, Our System of Education, Renaissance, February 1997, p. 26-33.
c. From Shehzad Saleem's The Role of Mosques, Renaissance, February 1997, pp. 34 and 35. For some other pertinent points see this article.
d. Mu'ahid is a person who belongs to that category of non-Muslim citizens of an Islamic State whose rights have been guaranteed on the basis of an agreement with the State. Non-Muslims in Pakistan belong to this category.
Dhimmi is a person who belongs to that category of non-Muslims who are vanquished by the Islamic State in war and then agree to remain subservient to the State and to pay it Jizyah (a tax on them) for protection and guarantee of their basic rights.
e. This obviously refers to taxes and other demands.
f. See the Qur'an 5:8.
1. That is human life.
2. That is unless it is a case where a court of law awards death punishment to a murderer or to someone who is guilty of creating disorder on earth (for example a dacoit) by taking the law of the land into his own hands.
3. Disorder, anarchy, chaos, etc.
4. Rebellion against an Islamic State.
5. That is eradicate it.
6. Therefore, the 104th verse of the third chapter of the Qur'an refers to such a body as is deputed by the State to see that the good conventions of the society are followed and the evil conventions are eradicated. Using its legal authority for this purpose is the responsibility of the Islamic State and, because of this authority, the right to use force (within the confines of that authority) is its prerogative (see the Qur'an 22:41). However, in the 71st verse of the 9th chapter, the words 'The believers, both men and women, are comrades of one another' point out that in this verse 'enjoining good and forbidding evil' (amar bi'l-ma'ruf wa nahi 'ani'l-munkar) refers to the responsibility one Muslim has towards another as his friend, brother and comrade -- in which relationship one obviously does not have the legal authority or the moral ground to use force the way government or any of its organs can.
7. See the Qur'an 5:33 and 34.
8. Allowed, which means that when the conditions are met it becomes permissible not obligatory.
10. Religious customs and rituals which were brought into effect by the Prophet (sws).
11. For a contradiction of the view that the Khuruj of Zayd ibn 'Ali ibn Husayn ibn 'Ali ibn Abi Talib was supported by Abu Hanifah and that of Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah was supported by Abu Hanifah and Malik ibn Anas (for example see Syyid Manazir Ahsan Gilani, 'Imam Abu Hanifah ki Siyasi Zindigi', Urdu), see Professor Hakim Syyid 'Ali Ahmad Abbasi, 'Mudhhab-i-Imam-i-A'zam Abu Hanifah' (Urdu), Mahmud Academy, Nazimabad, Karachi, 1985.
12. That is Allah does not like bloodshed. Bloodshed is after all bloodshed.
13. The evil that is on us.
14. Vol. 2, p. 4.
15. Moving away to another land when one's faith so entails.
16. The word Al-Jama'ah (literally: the group or the collectivity) does not therefore refer to a religious group or organization as some have taken it to mean erroneously.
17. That is 'killing' -- in other words a battle or war or any militant struggle.
18. Regarding the Qur'anic verse (22:39) 'To those against whom war is made permission is given [to fight] because they have been wronged...', Qadi Abu Bakar Ibnu'l-'Arabi says:
- Our Scholars, may God have mercy on them have said that neither war nor [shedding] blood had been allowed to the Prophet (sws) prior to the Pledge of 'Aqabah (Akhamu'l-Qur'an, vol. 3, p. 1297).
19. Migration to another land.
20. The government as a representative of the State.
21. As in a contract or agreement by which such groups are formed. The members are bound by promise and agreement not by political and legal authority.
22. Disorder on land, disruption, anarchy etc.
23. That is begin an armed struggle.
24. Da'wat-i-Din awr us ka tariqah-i-kar (Urdu), chapter 14. pp. 241 and 242.
25. There are only two bases for Qital fi sabil Allah. First, as a measure against some injustice or oppression*. Second, as a measure against those who deny God's message after Itmamu'l-Hujjah (revealing the truth so clearly that no excuse is left for a person or a people to deny it). Although the details of these bases are beyond the scope of this article, it would not be inappropriate to point out here that Itmamu'l-Hujjah is not possible by any person in his individual capacity or even by a group of people. Only that messenger of God who is sent to a people as the final chance can do Itmamu'l-Hujjah in his individual capacity. When the word Rasul is used as a term by the Qur'an, it refers to such messengers. It is also noteworthy that only in case of Itmamu'l-Hujjah by a such a Rasul all the people of a community he is directly sent to are ultimately always condemned to death -- either through some Divine chastisement or through Qital by the State formed by the Rasul -- unless they accept his Divine message as their faith. In case of Itmamu'l-Hujjah by the 'Ummah (the whole Muslim community) only the rulers of the community on which Itmamu'l-Hujjah is done may be sentenced to death if after the Qital they deny their people access to the message of Islam. The rest of the community are not to be coerced into accepting Islam. However, they are required to remain subservient to the Islamic State and are given all their rights in return. This is why now -- after the Prophet (sws) --, there is no basis whatsoever for death punishment for apostasy (for further details, see Shehzad Saleem The Punishment for Apostasy, Renaissance, November 1996, p. 44-48).
*. That is why the masses in the Roman and the Persian Empires often enthusiastically welcomed the conquests of the companions of the Prophet (sws) when they (raa) waged Jihad against the despotic and oppressive rulers of these lands.
26. Infidels, or those who deny the truth.
27. Here the word has been used as a Qur'anic term for such a messenger of God as is sent to a people for Itmamu'l-Hujjah. (Plural of Rasul: Rusul)
28. See the Qur'an 4:165: '... so that after these Rusul no excuse is left with people to present before Allah'.
29. The definite article in Al-Nas here refers to peoples other than the Ummah.
30. See the Qur'an 2:143, 22:178 and 3:110. See also 4:135 and 5:8.
31. See the Qur'an 16:125.
32. Perhaps, it would be more appropriate to refer to Qisas as the Islamic version of Lex Talionis.
33. Al-Syyid Al-Sabiq, Fiqhu'l-Sunnah, Vol. 3, p. 30.
34. Details of the incident can be found in the following sources:
Hafiz al-'asqalani, Fathu'l-Bari, al-Juz al-hadi'ashar; Kitabu'l shurut, Bab ma yajuz min al-shurut fi'l-Islam .... (Ahadith 2711 & 2712), Babu'l-shurut fi'l Jihad wa al-masalih ma'a ahl al-harb wa kitabah al-shurut (Ahadith 2731 & 2732); Kitabu'l sulh, Babu'l-sulh ma'a al-mushriqin (Hadith 2700); see also Al-Juz al-sabi', kitabu'l-maghazi, Bab ghazwatu'l-Hudaybiyyah (Ahadith 4180 & 4182)
Al-Shaykh Ahmad 'abdu'l Rahman al-Bana, Al-Fathu'l-Rabbani litartib Musnad Ahmad ibn Muhammad Ibn Hambal Al-shaybani, Al-Juz al-hadi wa'l-'ishrun, Bab ma ja'a fi 'umrah al-Hudaybiyyah ba'ada al-Hijrah..., and Bab ma ja'a fi 'umrah al-Hudaybiyyah wa sadda Quraysh al-Nabi (sws) wa ashabihi 'an dakhul Makkah... (Hadith 305) and Bab ma ja'a fi nass kitab sulh al-Hudaybiyyah. See also Al-Juz al-Rabi' 'ashar, Bab fi ma yajuz min shurut ma'a al-kuffar...
35. For instance see Al-Suyuti, Tarikhu'l-khulafa, Nur Muhammad Karkhana Tijarat-i-Kutub, Aram Bagh, Karachi, p. 207. Other references to this proposition may be found in Al-Tabri, Tarikh al-Umam wa al-Mamluk and Ibn Hajar 'asqalani, al-Asabah fi tamyi al-Ashabah. (See also Nasikhu'l-Tawarikh).