By agreed logic of partition, 14 out of 563 princely states including Kashmir were to come to Pakistan. Out of these 14 states only Kashmir needed a bit of attention. So it was not difficult to get all fourteen states included in the geography of Pakistan when the British, Muslim League and Congress were jointly preparing the Indian Independence Act. The Congress was of the opinion that there should be only one option for the states, to join Pakistan or India; and the people of the states and not the rulers should exercise the option. The Muslim League, however, remained adamant also on choice of independence, and that too, to be given to the rulers of the states, and not to the people, and that virtually meant dividing India not only at its east and west peripheries but also from within. Whether the stance of Muslim League was out of fears of a big India or due to lack of political concentration, none and not even Choudhary Muhammad Ali, one of the behind the curtain architects of the partition plan, knew (Reference his book "Emergence of Pakistan"). It was strange of Muslim League, which had acted so wisely and had humbled Congress on all political fronts to insist on so impractical a choice. Whatever the reasons, the stance created suspicion, which has perhaps become part of sub-continental psyche. 

Subsequently Pakistan accepted request of Nawab of Junagadh to accede to Pakistan, and encouraged Muslim ruler of Hyderabad to declare independence, which he in a way did. These states had above 80% Hindu population. The aspect that all this maneuvering would affect the right of Pakistan on Kashmir was ignored. The Indians even then offered adjustments on Kashmir vis--vis Hyderabad, but the leadership of Muslim League did not oblige. Why? No historian has as yet found the answer. Nor did Ch. Muhammad Ali. Thus Indian Independence Act's articles on princely states were thrown into the furnace, and militarism was opted as solution seeking instrument by both, India and Pakistan. India used it in Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir, and Pakistan used it in Kashmir. The fact that the deviation from logic of partition was bound to bring in element of force benefiting eventually the powerful was not comprehended. The strange irony is that the consequences of power-based tussle are still being ignored. 

When militancy began in Kashmir in 1989, 22 % Kashmiris, 18% Pakistanis and 35% Indians were living below poverty line. Today 30% Kashmiris, 40% Pakistanis and 23% Indians are living below the line. On psychological side the difference is much more prominent. Today 37% Indians are happy with their socio-political environment as against 9% Pakistanis and 8% Kashmiris. About their individual future 70% Indians are certain as against 35% Pakistanis and 25 % Kashmiris. The statistics regarding Kashmiris relate to Kashmiris of valley, where thousands perished in militant struggle, and two generations suffered from depression, and the disease is rather becoming endemic. In case of Pakistan, besides Kashmir conflict, political uncertainty also played a part. 

What are we up to? Why do we want to remain unhappy? The subcontinent has already lost thousands of lives, and wasted lot of time, energy and resources on maintaining the conflict: This inanity must stop. To reach an agreement on Kashmir is call of the hour. It is also a necessity to counter much bigger worries. Globalisation, WTO regime and a post 9/11 world demand that the developing countries should take a quantum jump to enter into wise relationships, if they intend to come closer to competing the rich North. To come closer, India and Pakistan need a conflict free environment, immediately: So, preparation for a working plan on economic interaction and a solution plan on Kashmir should begin----now. On economy, though working of the European Union can provide the guidelines, to prepare its blueprint will be a responsibility mostly of India, because it has a much bigger economy, which is based on indigenous knowledge also. It is not an easy task. It will require lot of permutation and accommodation to bring two different kinds of economies closer. 

Kashmir plan too will require an accommodating approach to bring different views to one point. First of all a glaring reality will have to be accepted that Kashmir of today is different from Kashmir of yesterday. In 1947 it was a disputed area between India and Pakistan. Today the Chinese (due to Kashmir border settlement with Pakistan and favors from India), Pakistanis and Indians possess about 20, 35 and 45 per cent of Kashmir, and none of them will like to part with a single inch of the area under their control. All of them claim they have genuine security concerns in and related to Kashmir. Given the wars between India and Pakistan, and a war between India and China, their claims carry weight. Moreover, the Chinese controlled Kashmir connects their two turbulent provinces, Sinkiang and Tibet; and hence China needs the area for internal security also. Similarly the Indians have their own internal worries: they stress that they cannot manage big disturbance that would certainly appear, if they agree to any unfavorable geographic alteration. If seen through their big and small volatile religious minorities, the terrible Sikh uprising of recent past, and continuing rebellions in their northeast, their stance is not that uncalled for. Pakistan too has internal concerns. It is bound to invite equally huge disturbance, if an irritating alteration is made in its present geographic position in Kashmir. 

That was about the outsiders, the Indians, the Pakistanis and the Chinese, whose position in Kashmir has become with the passage of time a definite link to their internal and external security. About the insiders, the various segments of Kashmiris, though time has not changed their economic dependence on Delhi and Islamabad, it has certainly changed their political priorities and perceptions. Today the Pakistani Kashmir has two administratively distinct entities. One, Azad Kashmir, enjoys greater autonomy; and it has its own Flag, President, Prime minister, Judiciary and Administration. The other, comprising Gilgit and Baltistan, is under direct control of Pakistan, and the people out there are satisfied with their status; rather they want to reinforce it further. They are demanding that their area should be made fifth province of Pakistan. Similar feelings dominate in Jammu and Ladakh, where people are satisfied with their Indian connection. On Chinese controlled area, which is impossible for habitation, all have silently accepted the Chinese position. With so much acceptance given to the post 1947 Kashmir, by a reasonable proportion of Kashmiris, and with concerns of Pakistan, China and India having enough logic, the solutions such as Independent Kashmir, entire state acceding either to Pakistan or to India, and any irritating alteration in present Indian and Pakistani positions are out of question. Thus taking Gilgit, Baltistan, Azad Kashmir, Jammu, Ladakh and Chinese controlled Kashmir as settled areas, a search plan for solution will require concentration only on the Kashmir valley, the area where the conflict still exists; and where the majority of the people are no longer in favor of accession to Pakistan. They want Azadi (Independence) and that too for the entire Indian and Pakistani Controlled Kashmir. 

Before the search for a solution starts, the Kashmiris of valley and the Pakistanis will have to be quite thoughtful on three subjects, besides the changed situation as explained above. First, the UN Resolutions are impossible to implement. They are not a compulsion on India; they rather facilitate India, because unless India agrees the plebiscite cannot be held. Second, almost entire world does not view Kashmir problem through Pakistani or through rebellious Kashmiri perspective. On question of freedom struggles and right of self-determination, it takes into account the factors of success such as geo-political viability, economic potential, and the extent of achievability: Third, internal and external constraints of India, which do not allow India to agree to a solution of extreme liking of Pakistan or Kashmiris of valley; and there is no way, not even a nuclear war that would change the Indian stance. 

Accordingly, Indians too should realize that engaging a people without winning their willingness is not a moral, wise and democratic act, and they will continue to live under the guilt of connecting a people through force, and on economic front, the continuity of conflict will keep the west side land access close on them, due to opposition from Pakistan, and that will be a tremendous loss to their advancing economy that needs markets and cheap energy.