On May 29, 2025 Prime Minister Modi addressed the ‘Sikkim@50’ celebrations in Gangtok via videoconferencing, congratulating the people of Sikkim on 50 years of “remarkable” progress.

He said, “Fifty years ago, Sikkim chose a democratic path for its future. The people of Sikkim aspired to connect not only with Bharat's geography but also with its very soul.”

As expected neither Modi nor his Godi media told the ugly truth that fifty years ago, Sikkim was annexed by India in what can be called a colossal display of intrigue and treachery in which India’s foreign intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), played a major role.

From 1642 to 1975, Sikkim was ruled by the Namgyal Monarchy (also called the Chogyal Monarchy), founded by Phuntsog Namgyal, the fifth-generation descendant of Guru Tashi, a prince of the Minyak House who came to Sikkim from the Kham province of Tibet. Chogyal means "righteous ruler", and was the title conferred upon Sikkim's Buddhist kings during the reign of the Namgyal Monarchy.

Sikkim became a princely state of the British Indian Empire in 1890. In 1947 when India’s Princely States were asked to merge with either India or Pakistan, the two Himalayan kingdoms of Sikkim and Bhutan remained exceptions. Sikkim continued its protectorate status with the Union of India after 1947 and the Republic of India after 1950.

Palden Thondup Namgyal (23 May 1923 – 29 January 1982) was the 12th and last Chogyal (king) of the Kingdom of Sikkim.

Bhutan, also a protectorate like Sikkim, became a member of UN in 1971 September. Chogyal was thinking in those lines and was pressuring India to revise the Indo-Sikkim Treaty to have a separate state like Bhutan. This is when (December 1972) Prime Minister Indira Gandhi turned to Rameshwar Nath Kao, the founding director of RAW, and asked him: “Can you do something about Sikkim?” She did not take kindly to the three Himalayan kingdoms, Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal, getting too cozy with each other. RAW was given the job of tackling them all.

Indira Gandhi knew too well her father’s expansionist ambitions, which were put to practice by Sardar Patel, the Home Minister. The latter had written to PM Nehru just a few weeks before his death in 1950, “Our northern and north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, the Darjeeling (area) and tribal areas in Assam. From the point of view of communication, there are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist…The contact of these areas with us is by no means close and intimate. The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or devotion to India; even the Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices. During the last three years we have not been able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas and other hill tribes in Assam.

“In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible that discontent is smoldering there. Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime ... I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Union would not miss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in support of their ideology and partly in support of their ambitions…”

According to author Nitin Gokhale, the author of the book: R.N. Kao, gentleman spymaster, a plan was prepared in Kolkata to deliver Gandhi’s goal within a fortnight by the then joint director of RAW, PN Banerjee, who also had a major role in covert operations in Bangladesh during 1971 war. Kao took the plan to Gandhi, who instantly cleared it. The strategy was to undermine and weaken the Chogyal through agitations launched by political parties led by Kazi Lhendup Dorjee (who was leader of the Sikkim National Congress (SNC)) and other younger leaders (like KC Pradhan)  who had launched a Joint Action Committee (JAC) in Sikkim against the Chogyal.

Kao’s officers, PN Banerjee and Ajit Singh Syali (who was posted as OSD in Gangtok and primarily collected trans-border intelligence on Tibet) launched their operations, Janamat and Twilight. Pradhan and Dorjee met Banerjee’s team in February 1973. In a meeting called on RAW’s request in Delhi, it was decided to “strengthen and encourage the agitation till it came to a stage where the Chogyal would be forced to approach government of India for assistance in dealing with the situation.”

It was further decided to publicize that the Chogyal had no right to be the king and once the agitation gained momentum, to send Indian army troops for occasional route marches to remind the people of their presence and make sure that the anti-Chogyal, or pro-democracy, movement was not abandoned.

As part of the plan, the local RAW team got down to the task of instigating and guiding the agitation, kept the anti-Chogyal leaders united and focused, and, of course, offered financial help whenever necessary, Gokhale writes.

In 2018, the former head of RAW operations in Sikkim, G B S Sidhu wrote a book titled Sikkim - Dawn of Democracy: The Truth Behind The Merger With India, in which he only confirmed what had been suspected before of RAW’s involvement. Corroborating all those accounts is that of P N Dhar, Indira Gandhi’s Principal Secretary, who in his memoirs Indira Gandhi, The Emergency and Indian Democracy (2000) reveals: “Under Kao’s overall guidance, the RAW team helped the pro-democracy leaders build up their organization and make their weight felt in the politics of Sikkim. This process had started several months before the storm broke in April 1973.”

Dhar is here referring to Chogyal’s 50th birthday, April 4, 1973, when there were clashes on the streets of Gangtok, leading to police firing and a couple of deaths. When Chogyal’s elder son, Tenzing, was stopped on his way to the palace, one of the Sikkim Guards opened fire on demonstrators in panic. This was used by Dorjee to whip up anti-Chogyal sentiment. A message was sent to Indira Gandhi: “Intervene quickly and fully before we are massacred.” By the next day, there was looting and arson on the streets across Sikkim.

Kao informed Gandhi that the takeover of Sikkim was imminent.

On April 8, 1973, Chogyal was forced to sign a suicidal draft prepared by India, which stated that administration would be taken over by Indian government and Commissioner of Police would be placed under GOC, 17 Mountain Division, of Indian Army. Dorjee then called off the agitation in Gangtok.

The Indian ministry of external affairs then selected IPS officer BS Das as Chief Executive of Sikkim. He was briefed about India’s ultimate objective in Sikkim: the merger of the state to the Indian union, and that for India’s strategic reasons (Sikkim Saga: B.S. Das. Vikas Pub.).

Over the next few months, RAW engineered more anti-Chogyal demonstrations and rallies in Sikkim. Kao also instructed Banerjee to allow the Nepalese or other extremist elements of Darjeeling to join hands in anti-Chogyal agitation. “We must ensure that in any agreement reached among the various political parties, India’s special position in Sikkim is further strengthened.  Neither the Durbar, nor the preponderant Nepalese community, nor the Bhutias/Lepchas should dominate the future setup of Sikkim. There should be ample scope for us to play one group against the other in future so that no one group becomes too powerful,” Kao wrote on his communication. He also noted that India could count on support from 70% of the candidates in the assembly in a rigged poll. Over six months of elections in 1975 in Sikkim, Kao wanted the agitation maintained. “Foreign secretary Kewal Singh was equally supportive and was ruthless in implementing India’s eventual plan to merge Sikkim with India,” Gokhale writes.

When the Chogyal thought of internationalizing the issue, RAW finalized its plan of annexation without any bloodshed. It needed to disarm the Sikkim guards, the Chogyal’s loyal soldiers. The Sikkim guards were to be disarmed on April 8 or 9, 1975, but before that public meetings and processions were planned in Gangtok demanding removal of the Sikkim guards, complete merger with India and removal of the Chogyal.

RAW stated in its plan that “In case the Chogyal asks for asylum, he should be moved to the India House. After some time, he may be shifted to a suitable guest house about 15-20 miles outside Gangtok.”

As scripted by the RAW, Dorjee wrote two letters to the Indian representatives; the first asking the Sikkim guards to be disarmed, and the second requesting for an emergency session of the Sikkim Assembly. Both  were executed to perfection with cooperation from the JAC. In April elections, Dorjee’s SNC party won with landslide victory, winning 31 of 32 seats. He got a new act — The Government of Sikkim Act, 1974 — passed in the assembly, giving Sikkim the status of an associate state.

Three battalions of Indian army brigade, led by Brigadier (later Lt General) Depinder Singh were deployed. “Troops marched to the palace and despite one sentry at the gate resisting (he was shot dead), it took less than 20 minutes for the Indian Army to disarm the Sikkim guards. The Chogyal was furious but was helpless,” Gokhale writes.

In the wake of the political upheaval, a referendum was swiftly organized—under the watchful presence of 20,000 to 40,000 Indian troops in a region with a population of just 200,000. It was a charade. Unsurprisingly, the vote delivered a staggering 97.5% in favor of abolishing the monarchy, effectively paving the way for Sikkim’s merger with India. Almost immediately, Kazi Lhendup Dorjee tabled a motion in the Sikkimese parliament calling for annexation. The motion sailed through the 32-member assembly, dominated by Dorjee’s SNC, which held 31 seats. One legislator later revealed that most members didn’t understand English—the language in which all official documents were drafted—and no translations were provided. The entire sequence of events, critics argue, bore the unmistakable imprint of Indian orchestration.

On May 16, 1975, Sikkim disappeared from world map as an independent country, and officially became the 22nd state of India.

Initially, China opposed the annexation. Later when the Vajpayee government of India recognized Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as part of the PRC, China tacitly agreed Sikkim as part of India.

Dorjee was honored by the government of India with the Padma Vibhushan award in 2002. Shun by his own community, Dorjee was forced to live a solitary life in West Bengal. When he died on 28 July 2007, Dr. Manmohan Singh, the then Prime Minister of India released a statement saying, "He [Dorjee] played a historic role as the architect of Sikkim's accession to the Indian Union and had the distinction of spearheading the State as its first Chief Minister from 1974 to 1979".

However, in contemporary history, Dorjee is viewed as a traitor by most inhabitants of Sikkim. In the elections held in 1979, Dorjee’s SNC failed to bag a single seat in the Sikkim’s legislature, effectively ending his political career.  He felt betrayed by Delhi. According to Sudeer Sharma,  the editor in chief of "Kantipur" (a Nepalese newspaper), who had interviewed Dorjee multiple times, the latter said that “I went out of my way to ensure the merger of Sikkim into India but after the work was done, the Indians just ignored me.”

Like many political figures used and discarded by greater powers, Kazi Lhendup Dorjee found himself sidelined once his role in Sikkim’s annexation was complete—his legacy largely forgotten, his name relegated to the footnotes of history. It is a cautionary tale for those in South Asia who might consider trading loyalty for short-term gain. India’s intelligence agency, RAW, skillfully exploited the long-standing animosity between the Kazi (Sikkimese equivalent of ‘Jagirs’ and ‘Jagirdars’) and Chogyal families—a rivalry rooted in a 1933 power shift at the Rumtek monastery, where a young Dorjee was replaced by Crown Prince Thondup. That personal grievance would later shape the political fate of an entire kingdom.

According to Captain Sonam Yongda who served as the ADC to the King, Chogyal could have still saved his kingdom from Indian annexation if he had listened to the advice given to him jointly by the Nepalese King Birendra, Chinese deputy premier Chen Li Yan and Pakistan's envoy in Kathmandu in 1974. They advised him not to return to Sikkim. “But  the King didn't accept,” said Captain Yongda. “The Chogyal was a great believer in India. He had huge respect for Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Not in his wildest dreams did he think India would ever gobble up his kingdom.”

As noted by Sudeer Sharma in an essay “The pain of losing a nation” (The Darjeeling Un-limited), India was playing a "double game". On one hand, it was supporting Lhendup Dorjee in whatever way possible against the King. On the other hand, it was assuring the king that monarchy would survive in Sikkim. The Chogyal was also an honorary Major General of the Indian Army. He never thought that his "own army" would act against him. It was only an illusion. More importantly, he failed to reach out to the majority of Sikkim’s population – the ethnic Nepalese.

On the morning of March 11, 1978, just outside Gangtok, the 26-year-old, Cambridge-educated Crown Prince Tenzing, the eldest son of Chogyal Thondup, was killed instantly when his Mercedes car swerved to avoid an approaching truck and plunged 300 feet down a cliff, into the valley. The dynasty, which began with the ‘Curse of the Namgyals’ (according to which the firstborn rarely succeeded to the throne), ended with this tragedy. The heartbroken Chogyal died in 1982.

It is said that the Sikkim Saga is also the story of three women - dominant, proud and unbending: Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India; Hope Cooke, American wife of Chogyal, the Queen of Sikkim and Elisa Marie, British wife of Dorjee, who wanted to be the First Lady of Sikkim. Only one could win that battle. It was Indira Gandhi. She had the RAW behind her to win Sikkim.

In 1978, Gandhi's successor, Prime Minister Morarji Desai, expressed regret and criticized the annexation of Sikkim. He said: “It’s wrong for a big country to do that. Many of the neighboring states were bothered about it because they are smaller, and they thought that if it could be done to Sikkim it could be done to others. But I cannot undo it now.”

How dangerous and conniving is RAW under Modi’s watch today? Can a similar political coup be orchestrated in other South Asian countries? The answer is provided by Ashok Raina, author of the book: Inside RAW: The Story of India’s Secret Service. He writes, “RAW was given a virtual carte blanche to conduct destabilization operations in neighboring countries, seen by New Delhi as inimical to India. RAW was given a list of seven countries (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Pakistan and Maldives) for its operations… It very soon systematically and brilliantly crafted covert operations in all these countries to coerce, destabilize and subvert them in consonance with the foreign policy objectives of the Indian Government.”  

Raina sums up: “RAW over the years has admirably fulfilled its tasks of destabilizing target states… The India Doctrine spelt out a difficult and onerous role for RAW. It goes to its credit that it has accomplished its assigned objectives.”

Ominously, what is admirable for India is a nightmare for all her neighbors.

Dr Siddiqui’s latest book - ‘Modi-fied’ India: the transformation of a nation - is due to be published this year by Peter Lang.